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uch has been written about artificial intelli gence, both from the perspective of possi bilities and opportu nities as well as from the perspec tive of risks and limitations. Here I make a simple point -evaluating the appropriateness of an algorithm requires understanding the domain space in which it will operate. While data science enables one to tran scend expertise in a particular do main, it nevertheless requires a deep familiarity with the question it is required to answer. Focusing on the answer rather than the question presents significant dangers. These are not necessarily physical hazards, but rather dangers to things like so cial norms, rule of law values, and the experience of equality. Deploy ing algorithms that do not avoid these dangers risks injustice in indi vidual cases as well as generating longer term threats to fundamental social and democratic values.
Consider the context of criminal justice. Risk assessment tools are increasingly used, particularly in the United States, to make decisions about bail, parole, and sentencing. (For a recent example, see [1] .) Such tools, based on learning from his toric data sets and offender surveys, raise issues even within the disci pline of data science. For example, a ProPublica investigation [2] found bias against African Ameri cans, demonstrating that there was a higher rate of false positives among this subpopulation. Given the importance of nondis cri mination as a social prin ciple, differential impact should be a question for evaluation alongside accu racy and precision measures. This can be done entirely within the discipline of data science.
However, there is a deeper ques tion about the use of datadriven decisionmaking in criminal justice that goes beyond metrics (however widely cast). This relates to the need for the machine not only to learn how to answer a question, but to answer the right question. This in turns requires an understanding of the nature and purposes of par ticular decisions. To take a simple example, would it be appropriate for a justice system to require some one to spend more time in jail (via bail, sentencing or parole decisions) because they have large feet, even on the assumption that people with large feet are historically more likely to commit a crime? This would seem to be the assumption employed in machine learning; quoting from an article comparing methods of fore casting recidivism to inform parole decisions: "For example, if other things equal, shoe size is a use ful predictor of recidivism, then it can be included as a predictor. Why shoe size matters is immaterial" [3] . The authors are of course correct that pure prediction (complete with testing of accuracy and precision) does not require explanation. How ever, when I have explained how these kinds of tools work to judges, they are generally disturbed by the suggestion that this would be a rea sonable basis for making a deci sion that affected an individual's liberty. Even where "dangerousness" is relevant, judges and data sci entists have different ideas as to what kinds of factors are relevant to that assessment. Deploying a purely predictive algorithm changes rather than replicates the way that these decisions are made, with im portant consequences for justice, fairness, and due process. Outside the context of crime, there are numerous contexts where it is important to understand the nature of the decision being made. For example, should universities ad mit students based on how demo graphic and other data correlates with the university's records of suc cessful graduates and alumni? Not only would such a policy be regres sive, it would resemble Gattaca's dystopia where innate characteris tics rather than our actions and performance take precedence in determining our futures. This is problematic even if some of those innate characteristics are better pre dictors of future performance than past performance.
So -how does one ensure that tools such as machine learning do not displace important social val ues? For those writing the program, it is important to understand the task -is it purely about prediction or are there other ethical, social, or insti tutional factors that come into play? Conversely, it is important to commu nicate clearly up the chain -explain ing inferences and assumptions to those relying on outputs in deci sionmaking. Evaluation is also cru cial -not only for accuracy but also for impact. Understanding impact requires broader reflection on the breadth of potential consequences and the likelihood and severity of potential harms. This has been a traditional function of technol ogy assessment (as practiced by the now defunct Office of Tech nology Assessment in the U.S., or members of the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment network), but it needs to move be yond poli cy advice to practical ethics within organizations.
More broadly, policymak ers and educators should be concerned about digital and algorithmic literacy across the population. Ser ious thought is needed as to what kinds of decisions can be de legated to what kinds of au tomated process es, not just within government, but also as a matter for public de bate. Where accountability mat ters for human decisionmaking, this needs to be preserved in any move towards algorithms. These are not easy demands, but they are the best route for ensuring that algorithms are fitforpurpose.
While data science is universal ist allowing inferences to be drawn from any dataset, its use in decision making requires an understanding of context. Predictive accuracy is not the only value that will be relevant, as can be seen from the examples of criminal justice and university admissions. A failure to acknowledge this will cause harms, at the level of both individuals subject to deci sions and the broader social fabric. To avoid this, broad literacy in data science is needed to facilitate enhanced interdisciplinarity, appro priate deployment, and comprehen sive evaluation.
